Musicae Scientiae
Special issue 2001-2002, 23-36

Some theories of emotion in music and their implications for research in music psychology

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• ABSTRACT

Work in musical aesthetics on musical meaning is relevant to psychological research on musical expressions of emotion. Distinctions between simple emotions, higher emotions, and moods are given, and arguments as to what kinds of emotions or moods music might be able to express (given music's semantic capacities and limitations) are summarized. Next, the question as to how music might express these emotions and moods is considered. The paper concludes with a number of cautionary points for researchers in the psychology of musical emotion: (1) musical expression always involves sonic properties, which must be taken into account. (2) If one uses "real world" musical stimuli, one may be faced with associative interference. (3) Context will often individuate emotional expression, transforming a simple emotion to a higher emotion by providing an intentional object. (4) There is not a simple linear relationship between intensity of a musical parameter and the intensity of an emotional expression. (5) Some perfectly good musical expressions of emotion may not arouse those emotions in the listener, yet it would be incorrect to call such passages "inexpressive." (6) Any emotions aroused by listening to music, while similar to emotions that occur in non-musical contexts, will nonetheless have a number of important differences.

In many studies of musical expression, experimental subjects are asked to rate or categorize a series of melodies in terms of a list of emotional predicates (*e.g.*, happy, sad, angry, peaceful, *e.g.*, Balkwill and Thompson, 1999; Gabrielsson and Juslin, 1996; Juslin and Madison, 1999), or to judge their goodness-of-fit within a single emotional category (*e.g.*, Schellenberg, Krysciak and Campbell, 2000), or with the framework of paired terms (*e.g.*, Zaminska and Woolf, 2000). While these studies have shown how various musical parameters (melody, rhythm, tempo, dynamics, expressive timing) contribute to musical expressiveness, their forced-choice experimental design obscures the fact that the musical expression or portrayal of an emotion is fraught with difficulties. Juslin (1997) is quite sensitive to this problem, and noted that when subjects were simply asked to write down an emotional

categorization for a melody, without prompting, the result was a much greater diversity of responses. Hence he concluded that "what can be communicated reliably are the basic emotion categories, but not particular nuances within these categories" (p. 77). This paper will examine some recent work in the philosophy of music and musical aesthetics which will help illuminate why this is so, as well as suggest some ways (and some contexts) in which music may be able to express more than a few, basic emotional categories.

1
Some preliminaries

It is often said that music is "expressive", or that a performer plays with great expression, but what exactly does this mean? First, one may be praising a performer for their musical sensitivity, that he or she has a keen sense of just how a passage is supposed to be played. Such praise is often couched in terms of the performer's "musicality" (in statements that border on the oxymoronic, as when one says that a performer plays the music "very musically"). Such praise may also be couched in terms of expression — that is, that a performer plays "expressively". I have little to say about these sorts of attributions, save that they are often linked to a different sense of musical expressiveness: an expressive piece or performance is one that recognizably embodies a particular emotion, and indeed may cause a sympathetic emotional response in the listener. Thus if one plays expressively in this latter sense, it means that the music's particular emotional qualities — its sadness, gaiety, exuberance, and so forth — are amply conveyed by the performer.

When we speak of the expressive properties of music, they may be distinguished from the expressive properties of sound. Sounds may be loud, shrill, acoustically rough or smooth, and so on. These acoustic qualities have expressive correlates and may trigger emotional responses, and of course one cannot have music without sound. However, musical expression is more than this: it requires the attention to the music *qua* music, rather than as mere sounds. The opening "O Fortuna" of Orff's *Carmina Burana* may shock (and indeed scare) the listener due to its sudden loudness (especially when the bass drum starts whacking away), but this shock is not a musical effect, as we may have the same reaction when we here a sudden "bang" at a fireworks display or when a car backfires. By contrast, in hearing the opening of Mozart's 40th symphony as having a quality of restless melancholy, we are attending to both the musical syntax and its sonic embodiment.

In a similar fashion, while some descriptive terms have emotional associations, these should not be confused with descriptions of emotions themselves. For example, Hoshino (1996) gathered the following descriptions of various musical passages: bright, warm, cute, *cheerful*, *joyous*, refreshing, soft, *calm*, limpid, gentle, noble, vague, rural (!), dark, *anxious*, mysterious, ponderous, old, *sad*, strained (= *tense*?). Of these terms, only the italicized items are properly regarded as emotional

descriptors. Note that most of Hoshino's descriptors refer to behaviors and/or appearances. Moreover, almost all of our behaviors have some emotional significance, as the manner in which we carry out even the most routine activities tells something of our emotional state (even if it is just "normal"). But a behavioral description is not equivalent to an emotional description. While I may be "jumping for joy", my behavior is simply jumping; more is required to establish that it is joy that is making me jump.

As Hanslick (1986) has noted, at times a musical work may arouse feelings in the listener through ad-hoc associations. In such cases the expressive qualities of the music are irrelevant, for it is the arbitrary association between a particular work and some remembered context that arouses the listener's emotion response. In other words, one must be on guard for the "they're playing our song" phenomenon (as noted by Davies, 1978; Dowling and Harwood, 1986). These associative properties may be quite strong, and can operate in marked contrast to the innate expressive qualities of a given piece, as in the paradigmatic case of a happy piece that arouses sadness because it reminds the listener of a lost love or deceased friend. As will be noted in some detail below, context plays a pivotal role in framing both associative and intrinsic meaning and expression. In the latter sense, context includes not only musical genre, but extra-musical information such as lyrics, the image track of a film, or the literary text which accompanies a piece of program music.

One last caveat: in philosophical discussions of artistic meaning and expression, there is usually what might be called "the inter-subjective agreement requirement". For example, if I show you a picture of a man on a horse, and you and everyone else says "that's a man on a horse", this confirms that the picture is a successful representation of a man and a horse. Moreover, this agreement is accomplished without any cues or hints regarding its representational subject. By the same token, in order for a piece of music to be "an expression of emotion X" there must be broad consensus among listeners that the music expresses X, a consensus arrived at without any extra-musical prompting. One problem for accounts of musical expression is that such inter-subjective agreement often does not happen; one listener says a given piece is an expression of anger, while another says it expresses hate, another jealousy, and yet another of sinister passion. What emotion does this piece express? While anger, hate, jealousy, and sinister passion are related emotions, the piece nonetheless fails to individuate any one of them in particular. Musical expression is plastic enough so that the same passage might be expressive of a wide variety of emotional states. It is for this reason that context plays such a crucial role in the individuation of musical expressions of emotion.

2
Emotions: agents, objects, and moods

In the late 19th century Hanslick famously denied that music had any ability to express emotions, and many 20th century aestheticians (and composers, most

notably Stravinsky) held this to be true. For there are two significant problems to be surmounted in claiming that a piece of music expresses a particular emotion. The first is the "who" problem: whose emotion is being expressed? Emotions are felt by living, sentient creatures, and as Budd has noted, "It cannot be literally true that [a piece of] music embodies emotion, for it is not a living body" (1992, p. 37). One is thus tempted to claim that a piece of music is an expression of its composer's emotion. But when one examines the compositional history of most works, such claims fall apart, for composers often write sad music, for example, even when they feel no particular sadness (as in the case of *Funeral March* from Beethoven's "Eroica" symphony). Nor are they in the throes of sadness during the entire course of composing a piece of music, since the compositional process may last weeks, months, or even years (see Davies 1994, pp. 170-73). Thus if pieces of music are expressions of emotion, they are usually disconnected from any particular emotional cause in the life of their composer. This also holds true for the performer, and his or her emotions during performance. While not denying that performers are often attuned to the emotional expression(s) present in a piece, especially when they are strongly expressed, one cannot assume that if a piece expresses, for example, violent anger, then the performer is violently angry while playing it.

If not the composer, then perhaps a musical expression of emotion is related to the emotional life of the listener; that is, if I feel emotion X when listening to a piece, then I might say that the piece expresses X by arousing that feeling in me when I listen to it. But a piece of music need not arouse an emotion in order to be expressive of that emotion — if, for example, on a particular occasion I listened to the *Funeral March* from Beethoven's "Eroica" Symphony and it did not happen to make me sad, it does not follow that on that day the *Funeral March* was not expressive of sadness.

The idea that music expresses emotions by arousing them in the listener raises another problem, the second of the two mentioned above. In contrast to the "who" problem, there is also "why" problem: why, generally speaking, do we feel a particular emotion? The answer is that we feel an emotion in response to a particular situation, and our emotion is directed toward *intentional objects*, that is, the people, objects, or events that play a causal role in triggering an emotional state (see, for example, Levinson 1990, pp. 341-47). Note that identifying the intentional object of an emotion, while necessary, is not sufficient to explain that emotion. For example, if you know I am jealous of a colleague — let us call him Frank — while you know he is the intentional object of my jealousy, you do not know why I am jealous of Frank. What is also needed is a story that explains what Frank has done that makes him the object of my jealousy (for example, Frank's winning an award I had coveted). So in many putative cases of musical expression, what is problematic is that, for example, while the music *seems* angry, it is not clear just why the listener ought to be angry, and what she ought to be angry about.

Not all emotions are like anger, jealousy, and frustration, as some do not require intentional objects. For example, while one can be sad due to particular event, one also can be generally sad, and such sadness is not dependent upon the actions of another person, a state of affairs, and so forth. As Radford has pointed out, "not all emotions, or occasions of emotion *are* rational, *i.e.*, they are not informed by, explained and justified by appropriate beliefs [that is, intentional objects]" (1992, p. 249). Radford also explicitly acknowledges that "we naturally call such feelings 'moods'." (1992, p. 250). There is thus a distinction between higher emotions which require an intentional object and simple emotions and moods which may not.

3
How music expresses emotions I: cognitivism

There is now general consensus that music can express moods and simple emotions, contra Hanslick (see Levinson 1996, chapter 6, for a summary of relevant discussions). But just how *does* music express simple emotions? There are two main points of view on this question. The first, developed (and much defended) by Kivy (1989, 1993, 1994, 1999), is known in philosophical circles as "cognitivism" or "cognitivist" theories of musical expression. The second, one with a long historical pedigree, can be termed "emotivist" or "arousal" theories of musical expression. Taking up the cognitivist charge, Kivy has repeatedly denied that music really arouses what he has termed the "garden varieties" or real-world instances of sadness, happiness, anger, and other simple emotions in the listener (though music may move the listener through its sheer beauty). For even simple emotions, when fully aroused, usually relate to an intentional object. Thus if we say that a piece of music makes us sad or angry, what exactly are we sad or angry about — the music? Its composer? The performance? Poor concert hall acoustics? And has already been noted, a piece that seems expressive of happiness may actually trigger sadness due to extra-musical associations.

For the cognitivist, the expressive properties of music are properties intrinsic to the music, and not, to quote Kivy, "dispositions to arouse emotions in [the] listener" (1999, p. 1). Kivy takes this position from O. K. Bouwsma, but he also acknowledges psychological antecedents for this view, in particular Charles Hartshorne's *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation* (1934), and Kivy cites Hartshorne observation that "Thus the 'gaiety' of yellow (the peculiar highly specific gaiety) is in the yellowness of the yellow" (1999, note 2, p. 1). In making this move, one allows that music that is expressive of sadness need not make the listener sad.

How exactly does music then express emotions if not by arousing them in the listener? Here Kivy, Levinson, and many others would agree with this explanation given by Budd (who takes this view in large part from the music psychologist Caroll Pratt): "music can be agitated, restless, triumphant, or calm since it can possess the

character of the bodily movements which are involved in the moods and emotions that are given these names" (1992, p. 47). Likewise Kivy develops a "physiognomy of musical expression" (1989) and thus claims that music is expressive of these basic emotions by its resemblance to human utterance and behavior. Music thus distills certain aspects of human expressive behavior, especially that of the voice, and renders those aspects into dynamic musical shapes. Levinson's (1990) argument that music can express some higher emotions, such as hope, is based on the his claim that some higher emotions have characteristic physiognomies which therefore might be musically portrayed. As an example, Levinson discusses mm. 57-66 of Mendelssohn's "Hebrides" overture (Op. 26).



Figure 1. mm. 57-66 of Mendelssohn's "Hebrides" overture (Op. 26).

While he explicitly denies that one need take any programmatic associations into account in his analysis — from the title, one may think of water, waves, sea journeys, ships, and so on (1990, p. 358) — he does take the musical context of these measure into account. After hearing the opening measures of the overture, which he describes as "anxious, restless, troubled" (1990, p. 368), Levinson describes the expressive qualities of example one:

> "We hear these phrases as a reaching for something, for something higher. These successive leaps, the second an amplification of the first, go some way to account for the melody's quality of aspiration [...] The [following] figure, seems in context also suggestive of the poised bearing, the restrained carriage of one who calmly hopes in the face of tribulation [...] Given the particular internal structural features [of the passage] [...] and given its obviously positive tone, [it] is justifiably seen, or heard, under the specific guise of a hopeful counter reaction to such dark humors [of the opening], rather than as just, say, cheerful or happy or contented." (1990, pp. 367-368)

Thus according to Levinson, music can individuate some of the higher emotions for two reasons. First, music can mimic their characteristic "look and feel", that is, those emotions that have characteristic gestures or bodily movements which can be captured in melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic form. Second, by providing expressive contrast over the course of a piece of music, a context may be established

such that a musical gesture may be understood as expressive of the appropriate higher emotion. Thus in the case of Mendelssohn's second theme, its upward-reaching melodic intervals are heard as "aspiration" (and hence hope) specifically in light of the previous turbidity.

Note, however, on this view that in order for the contours of a musical phrase to express an emotion, one must recognize that a particular *musical* utterance and behavior is akin to other, non-musical utterances and behaviors. Thus musical expression is mediated through our understanding of social behavior in general, and what might be termed a knowledge of "social musical behavior" in particular. It is for this reason that one may mistake musical expressions in an alien musical culture, not because we do not know the musical language, but often because we do not know the normative social behaviors onto which the musical gestures may be mapped.

It is worth noting that in non-musical situations our ability to understand another person's emotions is dependent on contextual knowledge, even when we are familiar with the norms of social behavior and emotional expression. Here is a hypothetical example: imagine that you see a person moving and/or speaking in a violently agitated way. You presume that they are angry — but you do not know if they are jealous or frustrated or grieving, to name but a few possibilities. While their behavior may be indicative of any number of emotions, it is only if you have some contextual knowledge regarding the person and his or her situation that you are able to recognize this behavior as a display of jealousy as opposed to grief, for example. By analogy, a musical gesture can be loud, fast, and melodically craggy, and it too would be heard as "violently agitated". Since violently agitated states of behavior often correspond to anger, absent any other cues as to what this music might be expressive of, we would say that it is expressive of anger. But if we heard this same "angry" music in the context of a film score, and find it used accompany the on-screen image of a character who has just seen his lover with another, we will rightly regard the music as expressive of jealousy. Such is the power of context.

To sum up so far: the "cognitivist" theory of emotional expression in music says that a piece of music expresses emotion *E* if a suitably grounded listener is able to recognize correspondences between musical gesture(s) (perhaps in particular musical contexts) and human social behavior(s) that are the outward manifestations of particular emotional states. Note that he or she need not assume that this emotion was felt by the composer (or is felt by the performer), nor does the listener have to experience that emotion while listening.

4
How music expresses emotions II: arousalism

As noted above, there are significant problems with the view that music expresses emotions simply by arousing them in the listener; that is, a piece of music is sad

if and only if it evokes sadness in the listener (see Mew, 1985). But as Robinson (1994) has noted, not only does music frequently express emotional qualities, it also frequently affects us emotionally by evoking or arousing emotions in the listener (p. 13). Thus many cognitivists (*e.g.*, Levinson, Davies, Walton) allow that our experience of expressive music involves an emotional response. But what kinds of feelings does music arouse? Are they the same as our "ordinary" emotions, or are they special "musical versions" of emotions? And what is their relationship to our understanding of musical expression?

A common tack taken by a number of philosophers has been to claim that music arouses our emotions, but in a special way. For Walton, who approaches all aesthetic experience as a special kind of imaginative activity, expressive music "evokes the imaginative experience of the emotion expressed: more precisely, music expressive of sadness, say, induces the listener to imagine herself experiencing sad feelings" (this cogent summary of Walton is from Robinson 1994, p. 18). In other words, for Walton our emotions aren't really aroused, but we imagine they are. For Davies (1994) and Levinson (1990), expressive music really does arouse the listener's emotions, but emotions of a greatly attenuated kind. As Kivy has noted with respect to their theories, such emotional arousals "must be weakened, [...] because they do not have the power to make us behave the way those emotions would do in ordinary circumstances" (1999, p. 11). For Kivy, champion of cognitivism, this is inadequate. We do not have imaginary or stunted emotional responses when we listen to expressive music, but real, full blown feelings — albeit feelings grounded by the musical object. For Kivy, what moves us is sheer musical beauty, and this beauty may be emotionally individuated: "Sad music emotionally moves me, *qua sad music*, by its musically beautiful sadness, happy music moves me, *qua happy music*, by its musically beautiful happiness, [and so on]" (1999, p. 13). Thus for Kivy, our emotional response to music is directed at the music object, just as our other emotional responses are directed at non-musical objects in non-musical contexts.

Robinson takes a different approach, one that tries to avoid making musical expression a special case. She considers most carefully what we really do feel when we hear expressive music, and then what we make of those feelings: "As I listen to a piece which expresses serenity tinged with doubt, [for example], I myself do not have to feel serenity tinged with doubt, but the feelings I do experience, such as relaxation or reassurance, interspersed with uneasiness, alert me to the nature of the overall emotional expressiveness in the piece of music as a whole" (1994, p. 20). Robinson takes care to note that "the emotions aroused in me are not the emotions expressed by the music" (1994, p. 20), and so for her it is not simply that sad music arouses sadness. Rather, our basic feelings — or perhaps "reactions" is a better term — of tension, relaxation, surprise, and so forth, are combined with our awareness of the musical gesture and syntax, and through this combination we gain a sense of what emotion(s) a piece may express.

5
Conclusion and implications for research

As is now clear, while philosophers of music now generally agree that music can express at least some emotions, there is much disagreement as to which particular emotions can be expressed, whether or not such expression depends upon arousing an emotional response in the listener, and if so, what kind of feelings exactly music does arouse. Nonetheless, philosophical discussions of musical expression have a number of implications for research in music cognition and perception.

1. Musical expression always involves sonic properties, and to things like loudness and roughness I would add the rhythmic properties of sounds (as indicative of coordinate movement, spatial location, and so forth). Moreover, alterations to the "sonic" properties of a musical passage may be made without changing its basic melodic or harmonic structure — the same melody and accompaniment played high, fast, and loud may convey a vastly different expressive character from its low, slow, soft version (the locus classicus of such variations is the various presentations of the "idée fixe" in Berlioz's *Symphonie Fantastique*; see also Juslin *et al.*, this issue).

2. If one uses "real world" musical stimuli in order to give an experiment greater ecological validity, one will often be faced with associative interference, especially if a well-known repertoire is used. One cannot control the contexts in which subjects have first heard and come to know such repertoire, their level of exposure, etc. Therefore in many cases newly composed or otherwise unfamiliar musical stimuli may be preferable, as they circumvent such interference.

3. Context will often individuate emotional expression, transforming a simple emotion into a higher emotion by providing an intentional object. Different visual and/or linguistic cues (including prompts that are part of an experimental design) can therefore give different expressive results.

4. There is not a simple linear relationship between the intensity of a musical parameter and the intensity of an emotional expression. A level of musical activity that is most apt for one particular emotion may be inapt for another. For example, a passage that is good at expressing "anxious anticipation" will not be made more expressive by making it louder, faster, and so forth.

5. Some perfectly good musical expressions of emotion may not arouse those emotions (or much of anything, for that matter) in the listener. Yet it would be incorrect to call such passages "inexpressive".

6. Any emotions that are aroused by listening to music, while perhaps similar to "real" emotions that occur in non-musical contexts, nonetheless have important differences. Even if context provides an intentional object for an emotion, transforming a yearning, longing passage into an expression of hope, it is not at all clear that the listener should feel hopeful, what she should be hopeful about, and so forth. Moreover, such hope (and its emotional stimulation) is commingled with

other aesthetic properties — balance, beauty, intensity, coherence — and those properties may (and most certainly will) also stimulate affective responses of their own.

It is also worth remembering that while we study musical expression in the context of "absolute music", we are rarely confronted with "music alone" (Kivy, 1990). Indeed, for most listeners music *is* songs or film music, and not piano sonatas or symphonies. Listeners have always gravitated toward music in the context of songs, cantatas, motets, operas, pantomimes, tableaux vivants, and films, rather than symphonies and string quartets. This is not because they do not understand symphonies and string quartets, but because perhaps it is those other contexts — where the musical gestures and expressions can be informed by lyrics, images, and stories — that the music itself can be most meaningful[1].

(1) The author would like to thank Gary Iseminger and three anonymous reviewers for their comments on a preliminary version of the manuscript.

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• Algunas teorías sobre emoción en música y sus implicaciones en la investigación de la psicología musical

Trabajar en estética musical sobre el significado de la música es relevante para las investigaciones psicológicas sobre la expresión musical de las emociones. Se dan distinciones entre simples emociones, emociones de mayor nivel y humores, y se argumenta sobre qué clase de emociones se pueden expresar (dadas las limitaciones semánticas de la música). Posteriormente se considera la cuestión de en qué manera la música podría expresar estas emociones y humores. El artículo concluye con un número de advertencias y precauciones útiles para los investigadores de la psicología de la emoción musical: (1) la expresión musical implica siempre propiedades sonoras que deben ser tenidas en cuenta. (2) Si se emplea el "mundo real" musical como estímulo nos podemos enfrentar a interferencias asociativas. (3) El contexto con frecuencia individualizará expresiones emocionales, transformando una simple emoción en una emoción de más alto nivel proporcionando un objeto intencional. (4) No existe una simple relación lineal entre la intensidad de un parámetro musical y la intensidad de una expresión emocional. (5) Algunas expresiones musicales perfectamente válidas pueden no implicar aquellas emociones en el oyente, aunque sería incorrecto definir tales pasajes como "inexpresivos". (6) Cualquier emoción relacionada con la escucha musical, aunque similar a la emoción que se desarrolla en contextos no musicales, nunca incluirá un número importante de diferencias.

• Alcune teorie dell'emozione musicale e le loro implicazioni per la ricerca della psicologia musicale

Il lavoro dell'estetica musicale sul significato in musica è importante per la ricerca psicologica sulle espressioni musicali dell'emozione. Si forniscono le distinzioni fra emozioni semplici, emozioni superiori e stati d'animo, e si riassumono dibattiti, ad esempio su quali tipi di emozioni o stati d'animo la musica può essere in grado di esprimere (date le capacità e le limitazioni semantiche della medesima). Quindi si prende in considerazione l'interrogativo di come la musica possa esprimere tali emozioni e stati d'animo. L'articolo si conclude con alcuni accorgimenti per i ricercatori di psicologia dell'emozione musicale: (1) l'espressione musicale coinvolge sempre caratteristiche sonore che vanno tenute in considerazione. (2) Se si utilizzano stimoli musicali provenienti dal "mondo reale", si può avere a che fare con fenomeni di interferenza associativa. (3) Il contesto farà spesso isolare un'espressione emozionale, e trasformare un'emozione semplice in una superiore fornendo un oggetto intenzionale. (4) Non esiste una relazione lineare semplice fra l'intensità di un parametro musicale e l'intensità di un'espressione musicale. (5) Alcune validissime espressioni musicali di emozioni possono non destare quelle emozioni nell'ascoltatore, tuttavia non sarebbe corretto chiamare siffatti passaggi "inespressivi". (6) Talune emozioni destate dall'ascolto musicale, sebbene simili a quelle che si presentano in contesti non musicali, mostreranno ciononostante una serie di importanti differenze.

• Quelques théories de l'émotion en musique et leurs implications pour la recherche en psychologie de la musique

Les travaux d'esthétique portant sur le sens musical ont une pertinence pour la recherche psychologique sur les expressions musicales de l'émotion. On distingue ici les émotions simples, les émotions supérieures et les humeurs et on soutient que certains types d'émotions ou d'humeurs sont susceptibles d'exprimer (étant donné les capacités et les limites de la sémantique musicale). On étudie ensuite comment la musique exprime ces émotions et ces humeurs. En guise de conclusion, on énumère quelques mises au point destinées aux chercheurs qui se penchent sur la psychologie de l'émotion musicale : (1) toute expression musicale implique des propriétés acoustiques, qui doivent être prises en compte. (2) Si l'on utilise des stimuli musicaux issus du "monde réel", on encourt le risque d'une interférence associative. (3) Il est fréquent que le contexte individualise l'expression émotionnelle, transformant une émotion simple en une émotion supérieure par le biais d'un objet intentionnel. (4) Il n'y a pas de relation linéaire simple entre l'intensité d'un paramètre musical et celle d'une expression émotionnelle. (5) Il peut arriver que des expressions musicales adéquates de l'émotion n'éveillent pas ces émotions chez l'auditeur; il n'en demeure pas moins qu'il serait incorrect de qualifier de tels passages d'"inexpressifs". (6) Bien qu'elle soit similaire aux émotions découlant de contextes non musicaux, toute émotion née de l'écoute musicale présentera quantité de caractéristiques propres.

• Einige Theorien zur Emotion in der Musik und ihre Implikationen für die musikpsychologische Forschung

Musikästhetische Arbeiten zur musikalischen Bedeutung sind für die psychologische Erforschung des musikalischen Gefühlsausdruckes relevant. Es wird zwischen einfachen Gefühlen, höheren Gefühlen und Stimmungen unterschieden und es werden Argumente zusammengefaßt, die sich darauf beziehen, welche Arten von Emotionen oder Stimmungen, Musik auszudrücken in der Lage ist (semantische Kapazitäten und Begrenzungen der Musik). Als nächstes wird die Frage betrachtet, wie Musik diese Emotionen und Stimmungen ausdrücken könnte. Der Beitrag schließt mit einer Reihe von Hinweisen, die in der Psychologie der musikalischen Emotion zu bedenken sind: (1) Musikalischer Ausdruck hat immer mit sonischen Eigenschaften zu tun. (2) Wenn man reale musikalische Stimuli verwendet, kann man mit assoziativen Interferenzen konfrontiert werden. (3) Der Kontext wird einem emotionalen Ausdruck oft eine persönliche Note verleihen, indem er durch Einbringung eines intentionalen Objekts eine einfache Emotion in eine höhere transformiert. (4) Es gibt keine einfache lineare Beziehung zwischen der Intensität eines musikalischen Parameters und der Intensität einer emotionalen Expression. (5) Manch erstklassiger Gefühlsausdruck findet keine ebensolche Entsprechung beim Hörer, aber es würde nicht richtig sein, solche Stellen „inexpressiv" zu nennen. (6) Emotionen, die sich beim Hören von Musik einstellen, werden — obwohl ähnlich mit Emotionen in nichtmusikalischen Zusammenhängen — nichtsdestoweniger eine Reihe wichtiger Unterschiede haben.